Abstract: I accomplish two things in this paper. First I expose some important limitations of the contemporary literature on the norms of assertion and in the process illuminate a host of new directions and forms that an account of assertional norms might take. Second I leverage those insights to suggest a new account of the relation ship between knowledge and assertion, which arguably outperforms the standard knowledge account.
Simple or not
The current debate over the norms of assertion has been funda mentally shaped by Timothy Williamson's defense of the knowledge account of assertion.
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The case for the knowledge account has since been contested, defended, extended and refined. peting "simple" accounts of the norm of assertion.
What is a simple account? 3 Simple accounts are singular be cause they say there is exactly one norm for assertion. The norm is rule-like because it stipulates that you have permission, or author ity, to make an assertion only under certain conditions. The norm is perfect because it imposes a perfect duty, one that applies strictly to each and every assertion. The norm is concurrently restrictive be cause the condition must be satisfied prior to or at the time of asser tion, rather than afterward. The norm is discretionary because it leaves it to your discretion whether you exercise your permission to assert; it doesn't obligate you to make any assertion. The norm is offensive because violating it justifies others in taking -or is at least apt to incite others to take -offense at your assertion, which might take the form of criticism or resentment. (Such an offense could be defeasible and excusable.) The norm is constitutive be cause it constitutes the speech act of assertion, just as the rules of a game constitute the game, in that they are essential to making the game the game that it is. Assertion, on this view, is a normatively constituted activity, such that a speech act is an assertion if and only if it is subject to the relevant norm. The norm is individuating 3 I don't wish to debate the decision to use the label 'simple' for these ac counts, even though, as will be evident to the reader soon enough, socalled simple accounts carry a surprising number of theoretical commitments. Using 'simple' to label views that share the ten features discussed below is largely a matter of deference to the way the literature has unfolded to this point, including most obviously Williamson's decision to classify his own account and some main competitors as 'simple'. If we wish, instead of 'simple' we could say 'purportedly simple' or 'orthodox' or some such. It makes no substantive difference. because assertion is the unique speech act that has the rule as its unique constitutive rule. 4 In short, a simple account says that there is a single, rulelike, perfect, restrictive, discretionary, offensive, constitutive, individuat ing norm of assertion, which has the form:
You may assert Q only if Q is S. 
Two previous non-simple accounts
This section discusses, in broad outline, two nonsimple accounts of assertion. An express account differs from its simple cousin by imposing a further constraint on the manner or basis of permissible assertion.
Recall that a simple account posits a single, rulelike, perfect, re strictive, constitutive, individuating norm of assertion, which has the form 'you may assert Q only if Q is S'. An express account posits a single, rulelike, restrictive, offensive, constitutive, individuating norm of assertion, which has the form 'you may assert Q only if Q is S and your assertion is E'. But, of course, for appropriately chosen values for 'E' and 'S', the fact that your assertion is E entails that Q is S. For example, suppose that E is 'expresses your knowledge that 7 Turri 2011a also hints at an openness to Extrinsic.
Q' and S is 'known by you'. Accordingly, we could define the Express Schema as follows:
You may assert Q only if your assertion is E.
A 
The main argument for a knowledge account of assertion
The primary and most widely recognized evidence for the simple knowledge account of assertion is an explanatory argument from linguistic patterns surrounding the give and take of assertion. Here are some data points:
(A) When you assert Q, even if Q has nothing to do with you or what you know, it's normally appropriate to ask you 'How do you know that?'.
(B) It is understood as an implicit challenge to your assertion to ask you 'How do you know that?'. It is understood as expli citly challenging your assertion to ask you 'Do you really know that?'. And it is understood as explicitly rejecting your assertion to say 'You don't know that!'.
counts. For instance, on Rescorla's (2009: 100) reading, Brandom (1994) advocates a mixed account, which also accepts a concurrent restriction on assertion, to the effect that you may assert P only if you have sufficient war rant to believe P. On this interpretation, Brandom accepts Ex Post Facto and Plurality.
(C) If someone asserts Q, and it turns out that he doesn't know Q, then we judge the assertion negatively.
9
And if he asserts Q but knows that he doesn't know Q, then we judge him negatively.
(D) When you're asked whether Q, even when Q has nothing to do with you or what you know, normally it's okay to re spond by saying 'I don't know'.
(E) In response to a question, the statements 'I don't know', 'I can't tell' and 'I can't say' are practically interchangeable.
(F) Assertions of the form 'Q but I don't know that Q' strike us as infelicitous.
(G) Assertions of the form 'I don't know whether Q, but I can tell you that Q' strike us as infelicitous.
The simple knowledge account's proponents point out that their view provides a unified explanation of this entire range of data, whereas none of its simple competitors can explain it all, much less equally well explain it all (Williamson 2000: ch. 11; Turri 2011a ).
The main objection to the simple knowledge account
The main objection to the simple knowledge account is that it for bids intuitively permissible assertions.
Critics advance two main types of example to substantiate this objection. First, there are examples where a subject asserts some 9
Sometimes it is said that we are entitled to 'resent' such an assertion (Willi amson 2000 : 246, Turri 2011a compare Weiner 2005) . But 'resent' seems too strong in many cases where it just turns out that the speaker doesn't know, as in some of the cases discussed in section 4 below. So where does this leave the simple knowledge account of as sertion? It clearly has impressive explanatory power, but some are troubled by its purportedly counterintuitive implications in some cases, and they charge that this outweighs its explanatory virtues.
It's at this point that I would like to take a step back and explore other options, and in particular whether we have overlooked ways of relating knowledge to assertion that have the same explanatory power as the simple knowledge account but which don't encounter such resistance in special cases of ignorant assertion.
Suberogation
You enter some shabby government office to take care of some an noying paperwork for some irritating responsibility. The room is packed. A sign yellowing with age greets you as you enter, 'Please take a number and we will be happy to assist you shortly.' You take a number, 117, note with disgust that they're presently serving num It would be good for you to do her this favor. We would praise you for switching numbers; we would think less well of you if you didn't switch numbers; we might even offer some gentle criticism after the fact; and arguably if you don't switch numbers, then you should later regret your decision. All this despite our recognizing that you have a right to your number, that you'd be within your rights to refuse her request, and thus that your refusing to switch is morally permissible. In a word, refusing to do the favor in this case is bad but permissible.
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A bad but permissible action is suberogatory (Driver 1992; Chisholm 1963 calls it an 'offence'). This is the inverse of the super erogatory. A supererogatory act is good but not required. The su pererogatory is an important normative category that helps us un derstand our moral judgments about actions in the interval span ning the required and the heroic. Similarly the suberogatory helps us, as Julia Driver puts it, to shed light on our normative judgments 'lying in the dark corners between right and wrong ' (1991: 295) .
A new role for knowledge
I will now consider a nonsimple knowledge account that builds on the insights from the previous section. This alternative posits a nondeontological, aschematic knowledge norm and accepts that there is a plurality of assertional norms (thus deviating from the simple knowledge account by accepting points 3, 4 and 10 at the end of section 1 above).
We have already seen that there are permissible but bad ac For those who don't share the intuition about the case as described: adjust the case by increasing the older woman's ticket number just enough until you feel it would no longer be wrong for you to refuse.
standard for permissible assertion (that is, you may assert Q only if you reasonably believe Q).
14 Third, reasonable belief doesn't suffice for knowledge. Fourth, your assertion is good only if you know what you assert (or: you well assert that Q only if you know that Q). If one is impressed by Lackey's cases of "selfless assertion," then it is harm less to substitute here 'you may assert Q only if it is reasonable for you to believe Q'. (For reasons to not be impressed by cases of selfless assertion, see Turri forthcoming a; relatedly, see Buckwalter, Rose and Turri under review, and Buckwalter and Turri under review.) Also, I should note that the motivation for this second claim is twofold. On the one hand, it is the most popular competitor to the simple knowledge account in the literature, and I am interested here in accommodating the intuitions of those who fa vor such a view. On the other hand, it is required in order for reasonable ig norant assertions to be suberogatory, on the standard definition of that normative category (as reflected in the first of the four claims from which my hypothesis follows). (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need for further explanation here.) 15 The analogous express rule would be 'you well assert that Q only if your as sertion expresses your knowledge that Q'. I favor the express formulation but won't pursue the matter further here.
claim that nonknowledgeable assertions are necessarily ethically bad. (Of course, that they are necessarily ethically bad is a possible view, but one I do not hold.) Rather, the current proposal is that the badness is internal to the practice of assertion -bad qua asser tion.
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To help illustrate the idea, consider that in many games there are moves that are permitted but bad in the game. For example, in tennis it's bad to hit the ball into the net, and in basketball it's bad to foul an opponent. Nevertheless, hitting the ball into the net is permitted in tennis, and fouling an opponent is permitted in bas ketball.
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How well does the PK account compare to the simple know ledge account? To answer this question, let's see how well it fares in the featured cases of reasonable ignorant assertion, and how well it explains the linguistic data that a simple knowledge account is put forward to explain.
The special cases of reasonable ignorant assertion were put for ward as counterexamples to the simple knowledge account. They are touted as counterexamples because, critics claim, they are intu itively permissible assertions. The simple knowledge account en tails that they are impermissible. But the PK account entails that they are permissible. So the PK account completely avoids this problem.
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For one account of the sort of normativity or value at stake here, see Turri under review b.
17
I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that I clarify that I'm not pro posing that nonknowledgeable assertions are ethically bad, and for sug gesting the analogy with permitted but bad moves in games.
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To the extent there is a problem, that is. I'm willing to grant for the sake of Can a PK account explain the linguistic data that the simple ac count explains? It does so surprisingly well.
(A) When you assert Q, it is normally appropriate to ask you 'How do you know that?' because we're asking you whether you performed well, and thus whether what you've done was worth doing. As the common saying goes, anything worth doing is worth doing well.
(B) We can apply similar reasoning to the range of aggressive ness felt from 'How do you know that?' to 'Do you really know that' to 'You don't know that!'. In the first case we're implicitly suggesting that you're not performing well, in the second we're explicitly suggesting that you're not performing well, and in the third we're explicitly accusing you of not performing well.
(C) When you're asked whether Q, normally it's okay to respond by saying 'I don't know'. This is because you're informing your interlocutor that you're not positioned to answer well, and so your answer isn't worth giving.
(D) If someone asserts Q, and it turns out that he doesn't know Q, then we judge the assertion negatively. This is because the assertion is bad, which of course merits a negative judg argument that there is a problem here. For those to whom it seems that these ignorant assertions are impermissible, such cases will seem like counterexamples to the PA knowledge account, and there will be little if any motivation to abandon the simple account. It's often assumed that the intuition is widely shared that reasonable ignorant assertions are permiss ible. But empirical investigation casts serious doubt on that assumption; see Turri under review a. ment (qua assertion). And if he asserts Q while knowing that he doesn't know Q, then we judge him negatively, because he knowingly performs poorly.
(E) Assertions of the form 'Q but I don't know that Q' strike us as infelicitous. If the PA account is correct, then this is like saying 'Q but asserting Q is a bad thing for me to do' or 'Q but I'm poorly positioned to be making such a claim'. These are odd because they are akratic assertions. We generally find akratic behavior puzzling.
(F) Assertions of the form 'I don't know whether Q, but I can tell you that Q' also strike us as infelicitous. This is because they are tantamount to the akratic assertions noted in (E). Utter ing 'I can tell you that Q' or 'what I can tell you is, Q' is a way of indirectly asserting Q.
(G) In response to a question, the replies 'I don't know', 'I can't tell' and 'I can't say' are practically interchangeable. We sup pose that 'can' here is elliptical for 'can do so well'. So 'I don't know' communicates practically the same thing as 'I can't well tell you' or 'I can't very well say'. And it is accept able to decline a request when you can't well fulfill it.
Returning to our question, 'how well does the PK account com pare to the simple knowledge account?', and supposing for the sake of argument that the special cases of ignorant assertion are at least plausible candidates for permissible assertion, the PK account seems to outperform its cousin. In the first place, the PK account entails that reasonable ignorant assertions are permissible, whereas the simple account entails the opposite. In the second place, the PK offers to explain all of the linguistic data points that the simple ac count explains.
In short, for those impressed by the simple account's explanat ory power but troubled by what it entails in special cases of ignorant assertion, the PA account is preferable: it offers enhanced exten sional adequacy combined with comparable explanatory fruitful ness.
Conclusion
I accomplished two main things in the paper. First, I identified ten assumptions that have structured contemporary theorizing about assertional norms. Explicitly identifying these assumptions enables us to readily organize a burgeoning literature and also imagine a host of hitherto unarticulated views about the nature of assertional norms, which future work in the area can profitably explore.
Second, I proposed a new theory that vindicates the intuitive links between knowledge and assertion, while avoiding the primary ob jection to the standard knowledge account of assertion. 
